Single Question. Whether the Moral Virtues are Connected

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I aska whether the moral virtues are connected.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the connection of the virtues, the question asked is whether...

2. That they are not:

Someone can be naturally inclined to the acts of one virtue and not to the acts of another, according to how he is put together or made up [viz. connection or complexion], just like someone who is made up one way for easily getting angry by nature but is not as inclined by nature to acts of concupiscence [cf. Ethics 6.13.1144b34-35]. So such a person can exercise himself more easily about the former acts than about the latter. Indeed he can absolutely exercise himself about the acts toward which he is inclined and not about those toward which he is not inclined; and thus he will have virtue as to the former and not as to those he is not inclined to.

3. Secondly, as follows: in whatever way someone is inclined, he can have matter for exercising himself in the acts of one virtue and not in the acts of another (for instance, a religious can have opportunity for restraining the passions but not for facing or enduring the terrors of war). Therefore he will generate in himself temperance without fortitude.

4. Further, third, as follows: when reason is in error, the will can choose against its judgment and yet choose rightly. Therefore, from frequent such choices a moral habit can be generated in the will and yet in the intellect prudence is not generated, because the intellect does not give right commands. And so there can be moral virtue without prudence.

5. Fourth thus: when, conversely, the intellect is giving right commands, the will is able not to choose what is commanded but to choose the opposite; and so prudence will be generated from the frequent commanding of the intellect, and yet moral virtue will not then be generated in the will, but rather vice will be; wherefore     etc .

6. Further, fifth: an act of despising all things for the sake of God is hard, and consonant with right reason.a So there can be a virtue inclining to that act. A pauper, therefore     , who thus despises things, seems to have the virtue whereby he is thus inclined. But such a person cannot have generosity, as it appears, because he does not have matter for that virtue. For he has nothing that he could give away. Similarly, many have other virtues who are not poor.

a.a [Interpolation] as an act of wanting death for the sake of God.

7. Further, sixth as follows: conjugal continence seems to be a virtue because it is a kind of chastity, and yet it exists without virginity, and virginity seems to be a virtue.

8. Further, seventh thus: magnanimity is a virtue and it seems repugnant to humility, for a magnanimous man thinks himself worthy of great honors and the humble man thinks himself worthy of small honors, because he reckons himself of little worth in his own eyes.

9. To the opposite:

Ethics 6.13.1145a1-2 “All the virtues will be present together in a single existing prudence.” Augustine On the Trinity 6.4 n.6, “The virtues that exist in the human spirit, though they are understood to be single, yet are in no way separated from each other. Hence, whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude are equal in prudence and justice and temperance.”

I. To the Question

10. There are many articles to this question: First, about the connection of the moral virtues with each other, and this either in their genus or in the species of their genus. Second, about the connection of any moral virtue with prudence. Third, about the connection of the moral virtues with the theological. Fourth, about the connection of the theological virtues with each other.

A. About the Connection of the Moral Virtues with Each Other

1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

a. Exposition of the Opinion

11. As to the first, the following is said [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5 q.16]. The Philosopher in Ethics 7.1-2.1145a15-b20 says that in every genus of goodness and badness it is possible to distinguish four grades. The first in the genus (that is, its beginning stage) is what by the Philosopher is called perseverance, the second grade is continence, the third temperance, and in the fourth is what is called heroic virtue. In the first two grades, to be sure, there is no virtue but only a certain imperfect disposition, on which perfect virtue naturally follows. In the third grade there is virtue commonly so called. But in the fourth grade the virtue is excellently so called, and exists in surpassing degree.

12. It is admitted, then, that in the first two grades there is not virtue, because in the habits of the virtues someone can be exercised in the acts of one virtue and not in those of another, and thus acquire perseverance as well as temperance, and one and not the other.

13. In the third grade a distinction is drawn, because virtue in that grade can be inchoate or average or perfect.

14. And so in the first two degrees [sc. of the third grade, the inchoate and average] there does not have to be a connection, for the same reason as before [n.12], because one can be exercised in the acts of one virtue according to these degrees and not in those of another.

15. But in the third degree of the third grade [n.13], and much more in the fourth grade [n.11], there is a connection.

16. The proof is multiple:

First as follows [Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.17]: “That is not perfect and true virtue which can fall away to the contrary of its end and fail, according to what Augustine says in a sermon about the works of mercy [Paulinus of Aquila, On Salutary Doctrines ch. 7, mistakenly included in the works of Augustine], ‘A charity that can be abandoned was never true’.” But if a moral virtue existed alone without the others, it could fall away from its end;     therefore it was not true virtue. The proof of the minor is that one virtue does not strengthen the will as regard other desirable things that it does not concern. Therefore , if the will only has this virtue, it can fall away as regard other desirable things that are presented to it. But by falling away as to these other things it can fall away as to the object of this virtue too; therefore etc     .

17. This is plain in an example: for he who has fortitude and not temperance is not firm in resisting delightful things. Similarly, he who has temperance and not fortitude is not firm in enduring terrible things. Therefore, if terrible and delightful things are presented to him at the same time, as that he commit fornication or undergo death, he can fall away as to the terrible things and so about the things of fortitude (and not about the things of temperance). For such a person would choose not to undergo death than not to fornicate, because he is not firm as to the terrible suffering.

18. A second argument to the same effect is as follows: it is a feature of virtue to work delightfully (from Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17); but one virtue without another is not a principle of delightful activity. The point is plain in the aforesaid example [n.17]. For if, when tempted as to intemperance, he does not have fortitude, he will, without delight, flee the things that belong to temperance, and so he is perfectly temperate only if he also has fortitude. An example can be put forward in the same way about avarice, that if someone is greedy he will choose to keep his money rather than his temperance.

19. Further, third as follows: perfect virtue leads to the end of virtue, because leading to the end is what perfection is in morals. But no virtue without the others leads one to the end, not oneself by oneself nor man in political community.     Therefore etc     .

20. There is a confirmation of this position in Gregory Moralia 22.1 n.2, “Whoever is held to be strong in virtue is then truly strong if he is not subject to vices on the other side.” And again 21.3 n.6, “One virtue without another is not perfect virtue, or rather is not virtue at all.” The commentator too on the beginning of Ethics 6 [Eustratius, On the Ethics 6 ch.6], “When temperance does not exist, how will there be justice?” - as if he were to say, “in no way will there be justice.” Again, the same commentator on the Ethics [ibid.], “We call temperance by this name [sc. so-phrosune in Greek] as being ‘what saves prudence’ [sozein phronesin];” and “The virtues are sisters to each other etc.”

21. The same is proved by the gloss on Revelation 21, “The city lies four square” [in Nicholas of Lyra 6 folio 272v “The four sides are the four principal virtues”].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

22. Against this there are many arguments.

[First argument] - First as follows: for you [sc. Henry] the two grades (perseverance and continence) turn out not to be connected, and likewise the first two degrees of the third grade (namely when virtue is imperfect or average) [nn.12-14]. I argue in the same way about virtue in the third grade of virtue, namely that someone who has virtue in the two first degrees of the third grade can be exercised in the third degree of one virtue and not in the third degree of another. For someone who has a habit of acting as regard the latter objects is not less disposed than someone else who has no such habit. So, if someone could exercise himself from the beginning about the objects of one virtue and not of another, then he will, when he has the habit of one virtue up to the first two degrees of the third grade, be much more able to exercise himself about the object of one virtue and not of the other, and so be able to acquire one perfect virtue for himself and not another. There is a confirmation, because opportunity to act on the matter of the other virtue (so as to be inclined toward it as he is inclined to what he has the habit of) may not be presented to him.

23. If it be said that, although the matter of the other virtue may not be presented to him externally, yet it is presented to him in imagination and he will have to make right choices about that, else the virtue acquired in any degree will not be preserved; - on the contrary: it is possible for the intellect not to consider the other things, but only those to which the habit of virtue inclines, for the intellect cannot understand two things distinctly at the same time, according to the common way of speaking [Ord. IV d.1 q.1 nn.22-23]. Or if other things do occur to it that belong to the other virtue, the will cannot make choices good or bad about them, but prescribes non-consideration of these other things and consideration of the things that belong to the virtue it does have. And so the proposed conclusion [n.22] will stand.

24. Alternatively it is said, and better, that a habit, however perfect it be in its natural genus, can be acquired from acts frequently elicited about the object of one virtue without the acquisition of another virtue; but the habit, however intense it is, will not be a virtue because it does not have the idea of virtue unless it is conformed to the other virtues already acquired in the same person, for the agreement of habit with habit is necessary in any habit for it to have the idea of virtue.

25. This statement [n.24] could be easily rejected if moral virtue were a per se being or per se one thing in the genus of quality.

26. But because I do not believe this to be true, as will be touched on below [nn.27-30], I therefore argue differently as follows: a virtue, when it has everything that belongs per se to the idea of virtue, is generated by acts conformed to right reason, so that the idea of a virtuous habit or act requires, over and above the nature of act and habit, only conformity to right reason. The proof is in Ethics 2.6.1106b36-07a2: “Virtue is a habit of choice as determined by reason.” But such conformity of habit and act with the right reason by which a person chooses can exist without the agreement of the other virtues present together in the same agent. The assumption here is plain, for one only rightly chooses in the matter of temperance if reason that is right and gives commands about such choices precedes. But it is possible for right command about one virtue to precede without there being any right command about the matter of some other virtue.     Therefore etc     .

27. [Second argument] - Further second: it follows from what was said [n.22] that any virtue will be the reason for the existence of another virtue; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. Proof of the consequence: for if the habit is not the virtue of temperance save because another virtue, say fortitude, is concomitant with it, then the virtue of fortitude, insofar as it is concomitant, will be the reason for that habit’s being the virtue of temperance. And by parity of reasoning temperance, as concomitant, will conversely be the reason for fortitude’s being a virtue; and any virtue generally will be the reason for another habit’s being a virtue. The consequent is false because it follows that some virtue will be a virtue before it is a virtue, and so there will be no first virtue.

28. Proof of all this.

Let us take that habit in the genus of quality which temperance must be. If this habit cannot be a virtue unless the virtue that is fortitude is concomitant with it, then fortitude will be a virtue before temperance is a virtue. And fortitude cannot be a virtue unless the virtue of temperance is concomitant with it, ex hypothesi [n.27]. Therefore, fortitude will be a virtue before it is a virtue.

29. The same point proves that there will be no first virtue [n.27]. For temperance is not the first virtue because it cannot be a virtue without the concomitance of all the other virtues possessing the idea of virtue (ex hypothesi). Nor will any other be first, because no other virtue can be a virtue without the concomitance of temperance as a virtue.

30. If it be said to this, and with probability, that a virtue can be a virtue when it has all the virtues concomitant with it, and although, in the idea by which it is one habit, it precede another, yet not in the idea by which it is a virtue; but all the habits, whether generated earlier or later, have the idea of virtue from their own nature and from mutual concomitance. - Against this: Then it follows that one act will generate all the moral virtues in their being as virtue, which seems unacceptable. Proof of this consequence: For suppose that the habit which is temperance has been generated, and consequently that the habit which is fortitude has been generated, and to like degree; eventually none of these habits will be a virtue until each habit is in the degree in which it is a virtue. Either then each habit exists before another or it does not. If it does then the conclusion is gained, namely that one habit can exist without another, and so there is no connection of the virtues. If each habit does not exist before another, then the habits will come to be at once through one act that has the being of virtue, which seems unacceptable, because that act seems to be an act of a virtue [sc. so some virtue would have to exist already in order for the act to be an act of that virtue]. And just as it would be an act of a virtue if the virtue had been generated, so it would be generative of a virtue [sc. if the virtue were not yet generated]; therefore it would be generative of them all [sc. for all are virtues together, by mutual concomitance].

31. [Third argument] - Further, third: it seems more reasonable that the species of the same genus in the moral virtues are connected than that two genera are. For one is more inclined to have an ordered disposition about connected matter (from the virtue one has) than about remote matter. Now the matters of the species of the same genus are more connected than the matters of diverse ones. But the species of the same genus of virtue are not connected (as virginity and conjugal chastity); therefore the virtues of all the species are not connected.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. As to this first article [nn.10-11] I concede that neither in their genera commonly assigned (as justice, fortitude, and temperance) nor in the more general ones that I assigned earlier [d.34 n.33], which is virtue as disposing affection to oneself and to another, are the moral virtues necessarily connected.

33. The evidence for this is as follows: Virtue is some perfection of man, and not total perfection because then one moral virtue would suffice. But when there are several partial perfections of something, that thing can be perfect simply according to one perfection and imperfect simply according to another - as is clear in man, whose property it is to have many organic perfections. Man can have one perfection at its highest, having nothing of another (as that he is supremely disposed to sight or touch but has nothing of hearing). One can therefore have perfection at its highest with respect to the matter of temperance, while having nothing of the perfection that would be required with respect to the matter of another perfection; and consequently one can be simply temperate, even as to any act of temperance, but not simply be moral without all the virtues (just as one is not simply a sensing thing without all the senses). Yet one is not less perfectly temperate, although one is less morally perfect (just as one is not less perfectly sighted nor less perfectly a hearer, although one is less perfectly sentient).

3. To the Arguments for Henry’s Opinion

34. Hereby is plain the answer to certain things touched on for the first opinion, that is, for the possibility of virtue’s falling away [n.16]. This is false of virtue, for virtue does not fall away, but he who has virtue can, through deficiency in another virtue, fall away as regard the matter of that other virtue. But the virtue is not for this reason imperfect, because it is not virtue’s job to direct man about everything but about its own proper objects (just as he who cannot see does not fall away more in hearing than if he could see, but rather he falls away in sensing).

35. If it be argued against this that thus a virtue is easy to lose and so is not a virtue, I deny the antecedent; on the contrary although falling away happen contrary to a virtue’s inclination, the good disposition is not corrupted save by many sins or vices, or by a few intense ones.

36. And the same point makes plain the response to what was said about delightful activity [n.18], for one does act delightfully as to the matter of the relevant virtue taken precisely [n.17]. It is pleasant, I mean, for him to abstain from the works of intemperance, but it is not pleasant for him to undergo terrible things, because he is not in an orderly state with respect to them. Therefore, in sadness he commits an act of intemperance because it is against his habit; but because it would be sadder for him to endure terrible things, he flees what is sadder and in a way chooses involuntarily the less sad so as not to fall into the more sad. I concede therefore that such a person is imperfect and acts sadly; but he is not imperfect, nor does he act sadly about the matter of his virtue [sc. of temperance], save only per accidens, because it is accompanied by another matter [sc. enduring terrible things], about which he is not virtuously disposed so as to act virtuously and delightfully with respect to it.

37. The same makes plain the answer to the point about the end of the moral virtues [n.19], because a single virtue does not lead one perfectly to the end of the virtues, just as neither does a single sensitive power lead man perfectly to the perfect act of sensing. But each virtue leads one as far as is it can, and all are required for leading one perfectly to act virtuously or delightfully. I concede therefore that one virtue does not lead one sufficiently to the end but - as far as in it lies - leads one sufficiently to the end, namely it suffices for the perfection of such virtue.

38. To the first argument that is added there from Blessed Augustine [n.16], I say that the Philosopher does not say in the Categories that a habit cannot be lost, but that it can with difficulty be lost. Although therefore a virtue could be lost and so he who has it could fall away, the virtue itself indeed does not fall away, but he who has it draws back from the peak of virtue. However it does not follow that his virtue was not virtue, even perfect virtue, according to the idea of habit, because it was not incapable of being lost but capable with difficulty of being lost. What therefore Augustine [Paulinus] says about charity needs to be understood as that someone was truly in charity who yet afterwards sinned mortally; but the charity was not the charity which truly joins to the end, that is, to blessedness.

39. To the authorities cited there:

About Gregory [n.20] one can say that he is speaking there about the virtues as they are the principle of gaining merit; and in this way it is true that one moral virtue without another is not virtue, because merit is not gained through one virtue if the others do not accompany it. For he who has moral temperance does not gain merit if humility does not accompany him, or at least if the opposite vice is present in him.

40. The same can be said to the gloss on Revelation [n.21].

41. The same again to the Commentator on Ethics 6, about virtues being sisters to each other [n.20]. I concede that although sisters mutually aid each other for common life, yet one sister is not another, nor does one sister essentially perfect another; the virtues do thus each well help each other mutually, each in saving the other. And in this can be understood the saying of some people that one of them is not complete without another, because one is not thus well preserved without another. For to a man exposed to many temptations in diverse matters, imperfection in one matter can be an occasion for acting imperfectly in another, and a perfect disposition in one matter aids toward right action in another matter; therefore the virtues help each other as sisters. But no virtue is essentially required for the perfection of another, just as one sister is born first without another, and so on, if they cannot be generated together. But two perfect acts cannot always be had together so that through them two virtues might be generated, because one perfect act of one power would impede the act of another power; they could then be generated together?

B. About the Connection of the Moral Virtues with Prudence

42. The second article about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence [n.10] has two doubts: the first about the connection of any virtue with its own prudence; the second about the connection of all the virtues with a single prudence.

1. About the Connection of any Virtue with its own Prudence

a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

α. Exposition of the Opinion

43. As to the first doubt [n.42], it seems that the connection is necessary, from the Philosopher Ethics 7.10.1151a10-14, where his opinion is, “If the will chooses badly, the intellect commands badly.”

44. The same Philosopher in the same place says something else for the same opinion [sc. to the vicious man things contrary to the final end seem good].

45. He says in Ethics 6.5.1140b19-20, 13.1144a33-36 that “malice makes one lie and err about practical principles,” and so it destroys prudence.

46. Again [1144a36-b1], “It is impossible for a prudent man to be not-good,” and conversely.

47. Again 1144b30-32, 45a1-6 [“It is impossible to be good without prudence, or prudent without moral virtue.” “All the virtues will be present in the one prudence; there will be no right choice without prudence and moral virtue.”].

48. Again 7.5.1147a25-b5 [“One proposition is universal, the other about singulars...; when a single idea from them arises, the conclusion must follow and at once action.”].

49. Again, I suppose two things: one that the intellect cannot understand several different things at once [n.23]; second that the will can will nothing under the idea of evil. I then argue: when there is only a judgment about fleeing some evil, the will either will flee it or will not. If it does flee, then the will along with right judgment cannot be bad (with abiding malice); if it can will evil [by not fleeing it], then it can pursue evil under the idea of evil, or pursue something unknown.

50. I reply that the first supposition [n.49] is false as concerns two altogether disparate things opposed to each other. The fact is plain from particulars. For a relative cannot exist or be understood without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance, nor much less can privation without its fitting natural subject, which privation necessarily presupposes a subject and an aptitude in the subject for the form that it lacks. So the intellect cannot understand privation on its own, as the argument [n.49] supposes, but only in a subject and in something ultimately naturally apt for it; just as neither can it understand one relative without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance. When the intellect, then, understands that evil is to be fled from and presents this to the will, the will can elicit an act that is material substrate for malice and that is even necessarily accompanied by malice in some way. Although therefore the intellect could understand a subject without privation, it cannot understand privation without a subject, for privations are immediate opposites in a subject naturally apt for them [III d.3 n.36].

51. Again in Movement of Animals 7.701a11-23, if the major premise is proposed by the practical intellect and the minor is assumed by the senses or imagination, the conclusion will be an action, so that action in accordance with it must follow, unless impeded. So never, according to Aristotle, is action altogether contrary to the command of reason.

52. And this is confirmed by Augustine on Psalm 2.5 “He will speak to them in his anger,” when he says Enarrationes in Psalmos 2 n.4, “The turning aside and blinding of the mind follows those who transgress the law of God.”

53. To the same effect is the statement of Dionysius Divine Names ch.4, “No one does anything looking to what is bad.” And that in Ethics 3.2.1110b28-30, “Everyone evil is ignorant what he should do,” with which Wisdom 2.21 agrees “Their malice has blinded them.”

54. The manner posited by Henry, Quodlibet 5 q.17.

55. If objection is made to these points on the base of the article condemned [by Archbishop Tempier in 1277], which says that “when there is universal and particular knowledge about anything, the will cannot will the opposite - error,” Henry replies in Quodlibet 10 q.10 that this proposition “when there is.. .knowledge... the will cannot will the opposite” is to be distinguished as to composition and division. In the sense of division it is false, for it signifies that the will never has power to will the opposite (which is false). But in the sense of composition it must again be distinguished because the ablative absolute [sc. the clause “when there is.’] can be explained by ‘if’ or ‘because’ or ‘while’.

56. If it is explained by ‘because’ or ‘if’ it is false, and it is true that this is an error; for it signifies that rightness in knowledge or the intellect is cause of rightness in the will.

57. But if it is expounded by ‘because’ or ‘while’, so that it indicates consequence or concomitance and not causality, then (according to him) the said proposition can possess truth, and is not an error and not condemned, but this in such a way that error of the intellect not be understood to be prior in nature to error of the will. For both are simultaneously concomitant with each other in time.

58. Still, the error of the will is by nature prior, so that if one considers the intellect as to its priority in nature to the act of will the intellect is right; but when the will freely errs, the intellect is blinded, and simultaneously in time but later in nature.

59. For this position the argument is as follows: If the first choice does not blind the intellect, then neither does any other, because the first can be as bad as any other. And if it does not blind when it is bad, it never blinds. And so, whatever actual malice there is in the will would never blind the intellect, and so someone could be as bad as you wish without any error of the intellect, which seems to be against many authorities.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

60. Argument against this is first from authorities.

One is from Augustine on Psalm 123.3, “Perhaps they would have drowned us...” where he says On the Psalm 123 n.5, “Thus are the living, he says, absorbed, who know evil and consent to it, or perhaps they die.”

61. The same on Psalm 68.23, “Let their table be a trap before them [sc. persecutors who would have taken us alive],” where he says On the Psalms 68 sermon 2 n.7, “What is it for them to be alive, that is, to be consenting, unless they know they should not consent to vice? Behold they know the trap and put their foot in it.”

62. Again he says on Psalm 118.20, “My soul has desired your justifications at all times,” where he says, 118 sermon 8 n.4, “The intellect went before, affection followed late or not at all.”

63. In support of this seem also to be the reasoning and authority of the Philosopher, Ethics 2.3.1105b2-3, where he says that “to know (or reason) is worth little or nothing for virtue.” But if rightness of the intellect in its consideration had right volition as concomitant, then since knowledge does much for consideration, it would consequently do much for right volition. Indeed something else follows, that it would not be necessary for anyone to be persuaded not to be vicious but only to consider according to the habit of virtue, for (according to you) by rightly considering according to the habit of knowledge the will cannot at the same time not be right; and so there is no need to persuade anyone about right willing but only about right consideration.

64. Again by reason:

When the intellect is commanding rightly, it is possible for the will not to choose, just as it is possible for it not to choose what is commanded by the intellect, for reason is not moved at the same time by this understanding and by that. Now when the will does no choosing, virtue is not generated in it; but from right command prudence is generated, according to you; therefore prudence without any moral virtue will be generated.

65. Again, that bad choice cannot blind the intellect so that it err about things to be done I prove as follows: the terms are the total cause of the knowledge of a first principle in practical matters as in speculative ones [cf. Ord. II d.7 n.88], from Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b24-25, and the syllogistic form is evident of itself to any intellect (as is plain from the definition of a perfect syllogism, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24 [Ord. III d.14 nn.38-39]). Therefore when the terms are apprehended and put together and the syllogistic deduction is made, the intellect must rest in the conclusion, the knowledge of which depends precisely on the knowledge of the terms of the principles and the knowledge of syllogistic deduction. Therefore, when the intellect is considering the principles through syllogistic deduction, it is impossible for the will to make it err about the conclusion, and much less to make it err about the principles. And so, in no way will the intellect blind the intellect so that it err.

66. If you concede the conclusion and say that therefore the will blinds the intellect, because it turns the intellect away from right consideration - on the contrary:

67. Thus to turn away is not to blind, for one could thus turn away while prudence still remains; for it is possible for a prudent man not to consider what belongs to prudence, but sometimes voluntarily to consider other things.

68. Again, the will has its wanting to turn the intellect away either while right command remains or while it does not.

If while it does remain, the will therefore wants to turn the intellect away when the will is not then sinning, according to you (because right command remains), and so the turning away of the intellect is not a blinding consequent upon sin, because there is not yet sin.

If while it does not remain, then the will has its wanting to turn away while some other act remains. Whence, I ask, does this other act come? Either from chance, and then the chance act is not a making blind consequent upon sin. Or it is necessary to posit, through an act of will (at a tangent to right command), another act of intellect, prior to the wanting to turn away; and then there is a process to infinity where, after the act of the intellect is in place, another ‘willing’ was present just as before. For it will always be necessary that the will turn first to this before it turn to that; and thus, if this willing was a sin, it was a willing that was bad while right command remained; or if this willing was not a sin but there was always some not-right command preceding the ‘turning away’, then some command precedes every sin of the will, and so the proposed conclusion is gained.a

a.a [Text cancelled by Scotus]. Again, ‘to will to turn away’ requires some act of understanding that is simultaneous in time or nature.

     This command is either an abiding command of right reason, from which the will wants to turn away, and then it follows that ‘to want to turn away’ is not for you a sin, because it stands along with right command.

     Or the act previous to the wanting to turn away is different from right command; and if that previous act is right, the same follows as before, namely that the wanting to turn away is not a sin, and so no making blind follows upon it. But if the act previous to the ‘wanting’ is not right, there will not be a blinding of the intellect following the wanting to turn away because the blinding precedes that wanting.

69. Again, either the will chooses badly while right command remains, and so the intended conclusion is gained; or, if it chooses badly, and therefore, while right command does not remain, it chooses on the basis of some act of intellect that is not right, therefore, because for you it would not then sin, this other and non-right act will be previous to the bad ‘wanting’; therefore there will not be a non-right act through another bad ‘wanting’. And so the intended conclusion is gained, for there is no circle on account of some process to infinity in causes and caused involved. Consequently, the will is not a cause of blinding for the bad command which, according to you, follows upon the bad ‘wanting’.

70. Again, no wayfarer is entirely incorrigible; therefore no one can err entirely about the practical first principles. Proof of the consequence: he who errs about the practical first principles has nothing through which he could be called back to the good; for whatever premises one tries to persuade him through, he will deny what is assumed, for nothing can be more known than a practical first principle.

71. Again, the damned do not rest in this proposition as something true ‘God is to be hated’, because then they would not have the worm of which Isaiah speaks 66.24, “Their worm will not die,” for they would simply delightfully hate God without remorse;     therefore etc     .

b. Scotus’ own Opinion

72. As to this article [nn.10, 42] one can say that right command can stand simply in the intellect without the will rightly choosing what is commanded. And so, since one right act of commanding may generate prudence, prudence will be generated there without any habit of moral virtue in the will.

73. And if so, it is then asked: how does malice, according to the above authorities [nn.52-53], blind the intellect?

74. It can be said to blind in two ways: in one way by privation and in another way positively.

By privation: because it turns one away from right consideration. For the will, when choosing the opposite of something rightly commanded, does not allow the intellect to abide in that right command, but turns it away to consider reasons for the opposite (if any sophistical or probable reasons can be found for the opposite); or at any rate the will turns the intellect away to consider something else that is unrelated, so as to stop the actual displeasure that lingers in remorse, the remorse that comes from choosing the opposite of what was commanded.

75. Positively it blinds in the following way: for just as the will, when rightly choosing the end, bids the intellect consider what is necessary for the end, and the intellect (by thus investigating the means ordered to that right end) generates a habit of prudence in itself, so the will, when it chooses a bad end for itself (it can indeed set up a bad end for itself, as said in Ord. I d.1 nn.16, 67), orders the intellect to consider the means necessary for attaining that bad end. Augustine well speaks of this in City of God 14 ch.28 [“Two loves have made two cities”], that the will has virtues in the way there dealt with; that is, the will by its virtue [or power] sets up a bad end for itself and bids the intellect find or bring forward the means necessary for attaining pleasurable things and for fleeing the opposed terrible things. And just as the habit of inquiring into the means for a well-chosen end (which habit is generated by order of the will eliciting it in an intellect giving commands) is prudence so, in the case of a badly choosing will, the habit acquired by command about things directed to the evil end is error, and is a habit directly opposed to the habit of prudence and can be called imprudence or folly. And this folly is not only a privation but also a positive contrariety, because just as a prudent man has a habit whereby he chooses things ordered to the due end, so the foolish man has a habit for rightly and promptly choosing means ordered to the end set up by an evil will. And because such a habit is generated by command of a badly choosing will, so to this extent it is true that a bad will blinds - not indeed by causing an error about some proposition, but by making the intellect have an act or habit of considering other means, means to a bad end. And this whole error is in things to be done, albeit it is not an error deceptive as to matters of speculation.

76. There could be another doubt here: If the right habit of the intellect and the good habit of appetite are not necessarily generated together (because it is possible to command well about something while not acting well about it), then is the intellectual habit generated without moral virtue prudence, or conversely is the habit generated in the appetite without the intellect moral virtue?

77. As to the first option about prudence, one can say that, strictly speaking, prudence is not without moral virtue, because it is ‘right reason about things doable in accord with right appetite’ from Ethics 6.2.1139a22-31, and appetite is not right without moral virtue. And if this be true, then the first commands about the principles of things doable would be right, and yet they would not be prudence but certain seeds of prudence. Still there would also be some rightly commanding habit about the means necessary for the end set up by the will, and yet it would not be prudence.

78. One could then posit a double intellectual habit about things doable, a neutral one and a right one, prudence. The one, indeed, which would precede right choice of the particular end, would not be prudence, because prudence is about the means ordered to the end, for it is a deliberative habit [Ethics 6.5.1140a30-31]: “deliberation is not about the end but about what is for the end” [Ethics 3.5.1112b11-12]. Prudence is also discursive (because deliberative), and so is about what one runs through in thought. But when the good end has been chosen, not only in general but also in particular, as that ‘one should live chastely’, there could be some deliberative habit of the intellect, giving commands about things for the end but not having right choice concomitant with it. And, as far as concerns the object, it would be prudence, for it would be right choice about things for the end. But the other condition would be lacking to it, namely that it be in agreement with and conformed to right appetite about the same objects [n.77].

79. In this way [nn.77-78] one should say that any habit generated in the intellect, though it be practical and right (whether about a particular or universal end, or whether about the means necessary for pursuing the chosen particular end), is not prudence if it is not accompanied by right choice of the will about the same things.

80. And if it be argued against this [n.79], as was argued against the previous article about the connection of the moral virtues [nn.26-30], that “in this agreement it would follow that prudence constitutes moral virtue and conversely, and so both habits (namely prudence and moral virtue) would ultimately be generated through one act, and that one act could not be of the intellect and will but only of one or the other, so it could not generate both” - to this one could say that the conformity of one moral virtue with another is not necessary, because no virtue is the rule for another virtue. But conformity with prudence is necessary for any virtue, because included within the definition of virtue is that it be ‘a habit of choice according to right reason’. And so for this reason there could, by way of concomitance, be constitution of a habit in moral being by prudence, and conversely; but there could not be constitution of the moral virtues among each other in this way.

81. Then it would be conceded that some habit in the nature of prudence was generated at the same time as another habit in the nature of moral virtue was generated; and they would be generated by the single habit and act that ultimately generates either moral virtue or prudence. For it is unacceptable in morals that one act ultimately generate two moral virtues.

82. But it is not unacceptable in the case of prudence and temperance, for the act that generates prudence in the nature of regulative principle also generates temperance in the nature of regulated principle. But this act only has the nature of virtue from the idea of being regulated, and for this reason it generates temperance in the nature of virtue. This cannot be said of temperance in relation to fortitude, because fortitude is not the rule of temperance.

83. One should say, therefore, that the two do not establish themselves in the being of virtue by any priority, as if one of them is a virtue before it makes the other to be a virtue; rather the intellectual habit of prudence and the moral virtue corresponding to it are simultaneous in nature.

84. And if one asks through what these two habits are generated in perfect being, I admit that it is through a single act, whether the act is a right choice (for without right choice of the end the intellectual habit is not in agreement with right reason and so is not prudence either), or whether the act is one of the intellect (for without right command of the intellect choice is not in agreement with right reason, and so is not virtuous nor can it generate moral virtue). Both the act of the intellect, therefore, and the act of will are able, by generating something per se in the being of nature, to generate it in relative being concomitantly and further to generate its correlative concomitantly; and so one act would generate both moral virtue and its prudence in nature simultaneously.

85. Accordingly, one could say that each habit, preceding right choice, would indeed be a habit of moral science or a certain moral science. For just as in things to be made the artisan differs from the man of experience, for the artisan knows the ‘why’ and the man of experience only the ‘that’, Metaphysics 1.1.981a28-30, and the artisan is not ready in acting but the man of experience is, as is said ibid., so in the same way in morals, he who has the right habit of the principle of things doable or of the conclusion but is not skilled in acting or directing himself about things doable, though he may have a remote directive habit (which habit can be called intellect or moral science), yet he does not have a proximate directive habit of the sort that prudence is, and of the sort that the habit of the experienced man is in things makeable.

86. Although these remarks seem probable applied to the distinction between practical science and prudence, yet prudence is not only about the means ordained to gaining the ultimate end but also gives commands about the ultimate end, at least in the particular case (as in the case of chastity).

87. The first proof is as follows: for moral virtue always follows prudence in a certain order of nature. Now from the choice of a particular end (as chastity) moral virtue is generated, so some prudence precedes the choice. Therefore it does not seem that prudence must properly be restricted to being only a habit about determinate and commanded means that are ordered to a chosen particular end, but also to being per se and properly about the end.

88. A second proof is that then there would not be one prudence corresponding to one moral virtue, for a moral virtue is one from the unity of the end to the choosing of which it principally inclines. But if there were no prudence giving commands about that end but only about the means to the end, there would be no object which would give unity to commanding prudence, but there would be many prudences about many means commanded for the end, although however there would, from the unity of the end, be one moral virtue.

89. So both because of the priority of natural prudence to moral virtue [n.87], and because of the unity of prudence as regard one moral virtue [n.88], it seems one must admit that the practical act which gives right commands about a particular end is properly prudence.

90. Nor is it a problem that prudence is said to be a deliberative habit and so is for the end and discursive [n.78]. For it gives commands about the proper ends of the moral virtues by proceeding from the practical principle (which is taken from a universal, particular, political end); and this discursive process is the first deliberation, though it is more commonly called deliberation about the means of the virtues.

91. As to the other point added there [n.78], that prudence is agreement with right appetite, it does not impress, for what is ‘naturally prior’ does not seem to have anything of its nature dependent on what is posterior; but prudence as prudence seems to be naturally prior to moral virtue, because it defines it. So what is there called ‘agreement’, as was touched on in the first question about practical and speculative theology [Prol. nn.236-237, 265-269], should be understood as the agreement that conforms right action to it, that is, that knowledge ought to be such that, as concerns itself, right action should be conformed to it; but such is knowledge, whether right choice follows in the one giving command or not.

92. One can say differently then that the habit generated from commands, whether about the ends (at any rate certain particular ones, which are properly the ends of the moral virtues), or whether about the means ordered to those ends (about which means there are perhaps no habits other than those about the ends), is properly prudence, even though right choice not follow in the one commanding. And thus altogether there will be no necessary connection of any moral virtue with the prudence that gives commands about its material. Yet, conversely, no choice can be morally right unless it is in agreement with its rule and its measure, which is right command. But right command is of a nature to generate also a single prudence; therefore conversely the connection can be conceded, that moral virtue cannot be without prudence about its matter.

93. To the arguments and authorities brought from Augustine [nn43-59], see the responses in Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 9 q.5.

2. About the Connection of all the Virtues in a Single Prudence

94. On the other part of this article [n.42], namely about the connection of all the virtues in a single prudence, the Philosopher seems to say that there is such a connection, Ethics 6.13.1145a1-2, “Prudence exists as one and all the virtues will be present in it.” See the Commentator there [Eustratius On Ethics 6.18].

a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

95. Now how there is one prudence for all morality can be posited in the same way as for the habit of science - see the opinion [of Henry] and its rejection Commentary on the Metaphysics 6 q.1, Lectura III d.36 nn.87-89, 91-101.

b. Scotus’ own Opinion

96. To this question, therefore, one can say that just as art concerns makeable things so prudence does doable things, and there is no greater connection of doable things as they regard one habit than of makeable things. So just as diverse makeable things require their own diverse arts, so diverse doable things require their own diverse prudences. And just as someone can be morally well disposed as to some doable things and badly as to others, so can one in giving commands be habituated to giving them rightly in these matters but not in those - and yet the former are not principles for giving commands about the latter nor conclusions following from the latter.

97. Now the way that all prudences are one habit, and all habits of geometry belong to one universal science, was stated in the Commentary on Metaphysics 6 q.1 nn.17-27, 40, 42. For a single formal unity is not to be understood there but a virtual one. For just as the habit about a first subject is formally one because of it and is virtually, but not formally, about everything contained in the first subject, so the habit that is formally about some end in doable things is virtually of everything of which the practical knowledge is included virtually in that end. But it is not formally of all those things, and so the one prudence formally is of all virtues virtually, if we extend the name ‘prudence’ to the habit that is the understanding of the practical first principle.

98. Accordingly one can expound the authority of the Philosopher in Ethics 6 [n.94] such that either he is speaking of one prudence formally, and then one must understand that all the virtues will be in one existing and perfect prudence, not only as to intension but also as to extension. Indeed, prudence is never as perfect in extension as it can be unless it is perfect about all the things that it can be extended to, and these are all the objects that belong to all the virtues.

99. Aristotle’s authority can be expounded in another way, not about unity formally but about unity of genus. For just as temperance is said by the Philosopher to be one virtue and formally different from fortitude, and yet each of these is a certain intermediate genus possessing many species under it (as was said before d.34 nn.31-33), so in the case of the numbering of intermediate genera one can say (because of the unity of the intermediate genus) that, although it contains under it many species, yet it can be one in unity of genus.

100. And by understanding the unity of prudence in this way, all the moral virtues are connected in one genus of prudence insofar as any virtue is connected to it according to some species or other under it. And this was stated earlier, on the supposition of the preceding article about the connection, mutual or not [nn.77-83], of any virtue with its own prudence [n.99].

C. On the Connection of the Moral Virtues with the Theological

101. On the third article [n.10], Augustine seems to say, Against Julian 4.3 n.17, that true and perfect virtues are not without charity. And his proof is that someone without charity does not glory perfectly in God.

102. Against this is Augustine in a sermon on Patience 26 n.23 (and it is contained in Gratian): “If a heretic or schismatic die in order not to deny Christ, are we to commend his patience?” So such a person has patience but not faith or charity; therefore patience can be without charity.

103. Again, when certain things are ordered essentially, as a disposition and the acquired form for which it is the disposition, the disposition can be without the form though not conversely. The moral virtues seem to be certain dispositions for charity, as natural happiness is a disposition for supernatural happiness, [so they can be without charity].

104. Further, third, the definition of moral virtue [n.80] can be perfectly realized in someone without theological virtue.

105. One can say that no virtues incline one to the ultimate end save through the mediation of the virtue whose per se function it is to regard the ultimate end. And so, if only charity immediately regards the ultimate end, the other virtues do not direct one to the ultimate end save through the mediation of charity. But, insofar as the virtues are certain instruments for perfecting man, they should be instruments for directing him to the ultimate end wherein is supreme perfection, and therefore the virtues are imperfect without charity, and they cannot without it be directed to perfection. Yet because this imperfection does not belong to them in their species (for to none in their species does it belong to direct one immediately to the end); therefore each of them can in their species be perfect without charity. To the extent therefore that they are said to be unformed without charity and to be formed through charity [Scotus Quodlibet q.17 n.8], to that extent charity directs them and their ends to the ultimate end, in which direction lies their supreme and true extrinsic perfection.

106. Hereby is plain the answer to the authority of Augustine [n.101], for the virtues are not true without charity because they do not lead to blessedness without it.

104. But, on the other hand, there is a doubt whether the theological virtues presuppose the moral virtues.

108. As to acts the answer is manifestly that they do not. For if someone who was previously vicious is newly converted, he has all the theological virtues from the beginning, yet he does not have the moral virtues, at least not the acquired ones. For he does not do with delight all the things to which his [sc. infused] virtuous habit inclines him; on the contrary it is delightful for him to act according to the old vicious habit previously acquired, and to be saddened by the opposite.

109. But if it be said ‘this man has at the beginning all the infused moral virtues’ (and the like, as about a child in baptism), and that thus is a connection preserved, for if he does not have them as innate he does yet have them as infused (the proof is that he will have them in the fatherland, according to Augustine [On the Trinity 13.9 n.11], who is adduced in the text by Master Lombard; and it is not probable that he would have them in the fatherland according to Augustine unless he had them as a wayfarer, and he will not acquire them as a wayfarer immediately at death). Although many things may be said about the infused moral virtues, namely that they seem to be necessary because of manner or means or end [Henry Quodlibet 6 q.12], yet because the whole end, which they cannot have from their species, is sufficiently determined by the inclination of charity, while the mode or means is sufficiently determined by infused faith, for this reason there seems no necessity to posit (infused) moral virtues other than the acquired ones in the case of those who have acquired them or can acquire them. But then there is no necessity to posit them in others either, because there is no greater reason why they should be infused in the latter than in the former.

110. And then to the point about children [n.109] one can say either, first, that it is not necessary to posit they have moral virtues in the fatherland, but it suffices that they be well disposed by charity about desirable things (charity, to be sure, disposes one about all wantable things under one idea of wantable) - just as it is not necessary they have science of everything in its proper genera, but it suffices that they know them in the Word, which is perfect knowledge.

111. Or, second, one can say that if they will have moral virtues in the fatherland, these virtues will be infused into them at the moment of blessedness. For it is not more necessary that what belongs to the wayfarer (if ever one is to be a wayfarer in the future) should be given in baptism than that what belongs to the state of a blessed comprehender be given at the moment of blessedness; rather the former is less rational than the latter.

112. Or one can say, third, that if the moral virtues belong to some perfection in the comprehender and it they were not given at the moment of glorification, then it will be possible to acquire them through acts performed in the fatherland. For just as no reason appears why comprehenders cannot learn some knowable things in their proper genus that they did not know before, so no reason appears that, by good choices about other things desirable for the end (and this not only to the extent these things are to be willed for the sake of God in himself, but also to the extent they are to be willed as advantageous for oneself), they will be able to acquire a moral habit inclining them to choice of such desirable things under the proper idea of these things, and so to acquire moral virtue.

113. As to this article then [n.101], I say as was said before [n.105] that the moral virtues do not require the theological virtues in order for these moral virtues to be perfect in their kind, although they would, without the theological virtues, not be perfect with a perfection beyond what they could have otherwise. Thus too it is not necessary conversely that the theological virtues, whether in the wayfarer or in the fatherland, should necessarily require the moral ones.

D. About the Connection of the Theological Virtues with Each Other

114. As to the fourth article, about the connection of the theological virtues with each other [n.10], I say that they are not connected, as is plain of the fatherland, where the habit and act of charity will remain without the habit and act of faith or hope [I Corinthians 13.8-13]. It is plain in the wayfarer, where faith and hope remain without charity in the sinner. There is then, from the idea of the habits in their existence, no necessary connection between them.

115. But what of their coming to be or infusion - are they such that one cannot be infused without another?

116. I reply: All things that can be separated in their being, such that one can exist without the other, can be separated one from another by God in their coming to be or their infusion. And so, as to infusion, they are not necessarily connected of themselves, but they are connected by divine liberality, because God perfects the whole man, according to Augustine On True and False Penance ch.9 n.23: “It is impious to separate off half a favor from God, namely because as he cured no one in body save perfectly, so too he cures no man spiritually unless he cure him perfectly.” But perfect health is when one have faith as to the intellect, and charity and hope as to the will, as is plain in Gratian Decrees, p.2 cause 33 q.3, On Penance.

117. But if it be asked whether faith and hope without charity would be virtues, one can say (as was said above about the virtues [n.105]) that they can be perfect in their species, that is, insofar as they are the principles of their own acts in respect of their own objects. But the ultimate perfection that they have in attaining the end, to which they are ordered by charity, they cannot have without charity. And this indeed is perfection both in morals and in theological virtue, although it is commonly said that it is perfection in attaining the end through some elicited act, or because of some order of these or those acts to the end. However, it can be said that the aforesaid perfection is precisely in the fact of their being accepted by God, through his ordering them to blessedness [Ord. 1 d.17 n.129]. Thus, to be sure, no moral virtue, nor infused virtue, nor moral act even, is accepted without charity, which “alone divides the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition” [Augustine, On the Trinity 15.18 n.32; Ord. 2 d.27 n.8].

118. But as to the intellectual habits, it is not necessary to delay over them. For it is plain that there is no necessary connection between them, unless some perhaps are subordinate habits, of which sort are the understanding of principles and the science of conclusions; and in these sorts of cases the prior is without the posterior though not conversely.

II. To the Principal Arguments

119. To the principal arguments.

The first two [nn.2-3] I concede, because they include what was said in the first article [n.33].

120. To the third [n.4] I reply that although a certain quality is generated from ‘frequently acting in a certain way’, a quality that is of a nature to be a moral habit (because it is of a nature to be in agreement with right reason), and that it would be a virtue if it had right reason in the agent, yet because there is no right command in him, the rule of right action is lacking. And so his choice, which is of a nature to be right, is not right because not regulated by rule; and consequently, though it generate a certain quality, it yet does not generate a habit of right choice, and so it is not a virtue.

121. The fourth argument [n.5] I concede, because it concludes to what was said in the second article [n.72] about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence.

122. To the other following arguments about incompossible virtues [nn.7-8], I concede that although one could reply that no virtues, even in species, are incompossible yet, insofar as one relates them to the issue at hand, they include the fact that diverse species of the same genus, or diverse genera, of moral virtue are not necessarily connected; and this was conceded in the first article of this question [n.32].